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Autonomy and Secondhand Oil dependency 
of the Yemen Arab republic 
Sheila Carapico 
Recent SCHOLARSHIP ON STATE AUTONOMY in the Third World has been 
influenced by the dependency thesis that capital accumulation at the core of the 
world economy is associated with economic underdevelopment and political 
dependency at the periphery. Dependency reasoning is rooted in a devastating 
empirical critique of the once prevalent modernization paradigm, in which 
national state policy was the central independent variable. According to 
dependency theory, peripheral nations' subordinate structural positions in the 
international political economy results in sacrifice of authoritative policy- 
making to foreign investors, bankers, experts, governments, and institutions or 
their local counterparts. Typically specializing in primary commodity exports, 
dependent nations therefore fell into a vicious cycle of deficits, debt, and fiscal 
crisis that worsens whenever the price of their prime commodity export fells. 
During the 1970s the considerable material affluence and political leverage of 
oil producers and even their neighbors seemed to ensure against this scenario. 
While dependency theorists wrote about Latin America and Africa, relatively 
few Arabists turned to world systems theory to explain phenomena, tradi- 
tionally viewed through a prism of culture and custom. The mid-1 980s' decline in 
petroleum prices, however, has revealed the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle 
Eastern economy as a whole to be as vulnerable to the vicissitudes of global 
markets as its peasants and herders once were to the weather. 
Most nations are tied into a world economy and susceptible to external market 
forces; but the complex interdependencies among the core North American, 
European, and the Asian economies differ significantly from the vulnerability of 
peripheral states, especially oil importers. Whereas the concept of autonomy 
("the relative autonomy of the state") is defined for core nations as the state's 
independence from the overriding influence of one domestic class, faction, or 
coalition, in the periphery the central question is whether the state is free from 
overwhelming external influence-whether it can, indeed, make and execute 
domestic political and economic decisions autonomously from foreign investors, 
creditors, governments, or markets.1 n the periphery, both state autonomy (from 
landowners, exporters, or other internal class interests) and national autonomy 
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(from forces in the external environment) are real issues on the debated agenda. 
A third, complicating issue concerns the hegemony of the state, the extent of its 
ruling authority, and its ability authoritatively to allocate values within its 
territory. 
The most serious criticism of dependency theory is that it points to questions of 
how internal politics and class formation influence national and state 
autonomy, but fails to seriously engage these questions, apart from noting that 
even within nations there is a center of power and accumulation and a periphery 
upon whose resources the core draws, either by exporting its products or by 
utilizing labor whose subsistence it does not provide. By locating the dynamic of 
dependency in foreign exchange, the basic paradigm diverts attention from the 
complex relationship among domestic classes, the state, and foreign powers, 
thus relegating ordinary politics to the background. 
Part of the difficulty and debate stems from the failure to analytically 
separate and define national autonomy and state autonomy. Each of these two 
variables is operational only when a prior condition has been met. National 
autonomy is at issue only for systems integrated into world markets, that is, 
nations that have gone beyond pre-capitalist autarky. Similarly, the question 
of state autonomy pertains only where the state possesses a fair degree of 
hegemony over the society, indicated by its capacity to authoritatively 
allocate resources for projects. Once this condition has been met, the question of 
whether the state is setting its own agenda or implementing the interests of a 
particular class comes into play. 
In the Latin American examples on which dependency analysis is based, 
nations are well integrated into the world economy and states possess a fair 
degree of internal hegemony. Neither the state nor the nation is autonomous, 
however; on the contrary, domestic and foreign interests, in coalition, mold the 
appropriation and allocation of resources on their own, joint, behalf. Even 
assuming this is a correct analysis of certain cases, other configurations are 
possible. These include situations in which the nation is but partially 
integrated into the world system, or the state possesses incomplete hegemony 
over the hinterland, or the class situation is poorly defined, or any combination 
thereof. In other cases, integration, hegemony, and class formation are fairly 
complete but the state manages, in one way or another, to steer a course 
autonomous from either or both domestic and foreign class interests. Where the 
state possesses neither hegemony nor national autonomy, it appears "suspended" 
above society and is not likely to have a firm class basis. Finally, a strong 
national class, whether feudal or bourgeois, shares the state's interest in 
hegemony and may in certain instances favor national autonomy. 
For the major oil-exporters' poor cousins,3 the cycle of expansion and 
contraction in the regional economy furthered capitalist and state penetration 
into even rural and frontier territory- to the point where both national 
autonomy from foreign donors, lenders, and trade partners, and state autonomy 
from indigenous capitalist classes, became issues. At this point, the question is 
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not simply whether "the state-that is, public officials writ large- [is] acting 
upon its own policy preferences, translating them into public policy," or "its 
authoritative actions [are] shaped and constrained by the expectations, 
demands, and pressures" of domestic classes or foreign actors.4 Also at issue is 
whether the state defines its own interests autonomously from dominant internal 
or external concerns. 
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), a small, nominally capitalist, Western 
leaning but nonaligned nation whose fertile soils and temperate climate make it 
home to half the population of the Arabian Peninsula, is in many ways an 
exceptional case for dependency theory. Until the 1962 revolution, a 
reactionary, pre-capitalist form of autonomy served the interests of a dominant 
tribute-collecting class closely aligned with the imamate. The revolution 
undermined rent- and tribute-collecting authority, but the rise and fall of oil 
prices, experienced secondhand, heightened the struggle among the state, 
domestic forces, and foreign powers for control over the allocation of resources for 
development projects. 
Precapitalist autonomy 
The YAR is a young state in an old nation. Often called North Yemen to 
distinguish it from its sister state, the People's Democratic Republic of South 
Yemen (the PDRY, a former British Protectorate), the YAR was born of violent 
revolution in the most isolated and undeveloped social formation in the Arab 
world. After the decline of the Ottomans, an obscurantist dynasty of imams 
xenophobicly and autocratically avoided external contacts, sealing the kingdom 
from European penetration at popular expense. Prohibited from engaging in 
foreign trade, most households were tied to the land as grain and livestock 
producers, exchanging food, implements, and household goods at weekly suqs or 
markets. 
Standard development indicators in 1962 showed widespread poverty, 
ignorance, and disease. Per capita annual income was estimated at U.S. $60. 
About 10 per cent of boys and 1 per cent of girls were in school, and adult literacy 
was about 3 per cent. Life expectancy at birth was only 36 years, and six out of ten 
children died before their fifth birthday. Smallpox, leprosy, and tuberculosis 
were endemic. Even more debilitating were water-borne parasites, dysentery, 
and complications from pregnancy and childbirth. There were no paved roads or 
electricity systems, so annual energy consumption per capita was only the 
equivalent of seven kilograms of oil; very few households had uncontaminated 
sources of water, and transistor radios were rare indeed. Three secondary schools 
trained a select cadre of future officials and military officers, the latter often 
drawn from low-status groups to minimize their potential political following. 
Foreign trade was restricted tomonopoly concessions granted to members of the 
ruling family in partnership with a handful of favored merchants. So limited 
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was trade that there was no need to establish a national currency; what 
exchanges could not be agreed upon by barter utilized a silver thaler of Austrian 
origin. There were no banks or public sources of credit save a Saudi branch office. 
A few Italians and other Europeans traded through the North Yemeni Red Sea 
port of Hodeidah, but there were no foreign corporations. 
In this pre-capitalist enclave, a dominant tribute-collecting mode of 
production, organized politically in the imamate, coexisted with a communal- 
subsistence mode, orgainzed politically in the tribes. The major class groups were 
therefore (l)tribute collectors, expecially tax farmers and landlords but also 
state functionaries, whose control of the use of force nabled them to extract and 
redistribute among themselves surpluses produced by the farming majority; 
(2)sharecroppers who, depending on environmental and contract conditions, paid 
from one- to three-quarters of their produce as rent or taxes; (3)smallholders 
who raised food crops and livestock for household consumption but were also 
subject to taxation and quartering of troops; and (4)tradespeople, including 
artisans and peddlers, who were dependent ori the consumption demands of other 
classes. A miniscule fifth class was made up of merchants, their profits secured 
through royal favor and monopoly supplies of coffee, cotton, and imports rather 
than through active trade. Pre-revolution Yemen was not characterized by class 
mobility, although in the twentieth century young men began to escape to the 
British port at Aden. 
The state transparently served the interests of tribute-collecting classes, and 
its power was greatest where landowners collected both taxes and rents. 
Proportions of land under sharecropping reached one hundred per cent in the 
spate-irrigated, tropical wadis of the Tihama coastal plain and on the fertile, 
temperate terraces of the western and especially the southern uplands, 
although some large estates could be found even in irrigated pockets of the more 
rocky, arid central and northeastern plateau, where smallholders tended to 
predominate. Independent grain farmers, especially in the northern and central 
regions, were organized politically into tribes and tribal confederations that 
resisted royal adminstration and taxation. Not just the post-Ottoman period but 
centuries of Yemeni history could be summarized as central states' efforts to bribe 
or brutalize the tribes' shaykhs into submission, in effect o impose the tribute- 
collecting system. 
Even as the imamate struggled for political and class hegemony, the system 
was being undermined from within and without. The weakest points were where 
the tributary system came into contact with external commercial capital: in 
Hodeidah, and through clandestine commerce and communications between 
Aden, in South Yemen, and North Yemen's southern provinces of Ibb and Ta 'iz. 
The defection of traders from the imams' monopolistic licensing system, the 
migration of thousands of smallholders, traders, tenants, and even sons of 
landowners and tax collectors, and the penetration of ideological influences from 
the Ba°th to the Muslim Brotherhood into the army and the ruling classes, all 
conspired to destroy the semi-feudal order. In September 1962, the old imam 
died in his sleep and the Palace Guard prevented his son from assuming the 
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throne. Within days, the young republic banned the most hated extortions of tax 
collectors, nationalized the royal family's holdings, and lifted restrictions on 
international trade, investment, technology, travel, and repatriation. Soon 
Yemeni riyals were minted and circulated. The main fetters to capitalist 
development were gone. 
Elements of the ancien régime fought back, and the civil war became a regional 
conflict. cAbd al-Nasir dispatched Egyptian forces to assist the republican coup 
while the Saudis committed themselves to restoration of the monarchy. Egypt's 
interest dwindled after its 1967 defeat by Israel while Saudi attitudes toward 
the Y AR changed after the radical anti-imperialist revolution in South Yemen 
(the People's Democratic Republic or PDRY) in 1968/69. The war in North 
Yemen formally ended in 1970 with Saudi acceptance of a modernizing 
republican regime with old royalists in its civilian coalition. The YAR was 
indebted to Egypt, hoped for Saudi charity, and attracted small international 
aid packages. Expatriate Arab advisors figured very prominently in the newly 
created or restructured ministries. Although subsistence agriculture continued to 
support a majority of tenant and smallholding families, imports climbed while 
exports tagnated. 
The commercial bonanza 
The infusion of oil revenues into neighboring countries occurred as a tentative 
peace settled over the YAR's newly liberalized economy, at a time when the 
power of the tributary system had been broken but issues of internal power and 
organization were yet unresolved, when purses were strained by a destructive 
civil war and by a drought in 1971/72, and when both the Yemeni riyal and 
imported consumer goods were penetrating urban and rural markets. Part of the 
revenues to the Arab Gulf found their way via private transfers and official 
assistance to Yemen, where they financed rapid expansion, particularly in the 
construction, transport, and services sectors. The combined effects of migration 
and remittances led to what one team of observers labeled the "anomaly of a 
labor-short, capital-surplus, least-developed economy."5 In this anomalous 
situation, the mobility and scarcity of labor, the expansion of the market, the 
increased value of non-landed wealth, and rapid growth in consumption tended 
to exacerbate unresolved tensions in ways that involved foreign powers more 
deeply in Yemeni affairs. 
Cash remittances to a population of around eight million topped a billion 
dollars in 1979, and rose to $1.6 billion a year in the early 1980s. These funds 
were virtually untaxed, and two-thirds remained outside the nascent banking 
system, beyond the reach of the state and formal financial institutions. 
Remittances bought a transition from consumption of domestic products to 
consumption of goods from abroad. Despite the alarming ratio of exports to 
imports, the YAR sustained an overall balance of payments surplus, currency 
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parity with the dollar and the Saudi riyal, and national reserves that were the 
envy of most Third World oil importers throughout the 1970s. Labor was a 
valuable export commodity. 
Migration abroad was not new to the Yemeni labor force, but now occurred on an 
unprecedented scale. It is no mystery why over a million Yemeni men- about a 
third of the male workforce, or "one from every house," as villagers put it-went 
to Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states during the oil boom. Internal iberalization, 
mobility, and hardship all coincided with the bonanza next door. Travel 
overland was easy, given the absence of passport checks until after 1978 and 
customary long-distance trade, herding, marriage, and pilgrimage across the 
unmarked border. Jobs and petty entrepreneurial opportunities for Yemenis 
either working alone or for fellow villagers abounded, especially in the 
construction and tertiary sectors. Rates of remuneration were good, and frugal 
living guaranteed high savings. 
The export of male labor had several ramifications for the domestic economy.6 
In the grain farming cycle, some seasonally redundant male labor could be spared 
without sacrificing productivity. Beyond this point, however, the loss of labor 
encouraged the taking of shortcuts (such as less frequent pruning) and 
abandonment of marginal terraces (supporting a row or two of sorghum). This 
tendency was exacerbated by the appearance of day labor, used especially for 
seasonal tasks like plowing and terrace maintenance, and the subsequent 
inflation in its cost. Eventually, farm hands became so expensive (unskilled, 
about YR 50 or $11 per day) that cropshares were renegotiated to benefit enants, 
and high labor costs discouraged large and intermediate-scale farmers from 
intensifying production. With overall GDP growth at 8 per cent per annum, 
agriculture stagnated. The proportion of the workforce on the farm slid from 
near 90 per cent on the eve of the revolution to 78 per cent in 1975 and less than 
half in the early 1980s. The highest percentage increases were in construction (25 
per cent), trade and finance (60 per cent), and mining and manufacturing (10 per 
cent). Yet the World Bank estimated an additional 38,000 workers were needed 
at all levels. 
Loss of labor was only half the story. The other half was the flood of 
remittances, which in practice meant goods as well as cash. Before turning to the 
question of how remittances modified overall patterns of consumption and 
especially investments, it is important to map the forms and distribution of 
remittances. Wages and profits were transmitted back in three forms. First, it 
was business-wise to purchase consumer items in the Gulf. Migrants bought and 
loaded a pickup or tractor-trailer truck with goods for their families and to sell, 
typically with a mind to using the vehicle to generate future income. Many 
"migrants" made regular round trips, bearing goods purchased cheaply into the 
Y AR and returning north with passengers and occasionally livestock or 
watermelons. Only toward the end of the period did the YAR government begin 
to tax this trade and curb smuggling. 
Secondly, remittance agents and traders transferred funds for longer term 
migrants, accepting deposits in Saudi Arabia with instructions for stipends back 
home, purchase and storage of building materials, or investments in urban real 
estate. Agents thus performed a range of financial services, for a commission, and 
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represented an important element in the emerging bourgeoisie. A handful of big 
moneychangers dominating the market made vast fortunes, while a much 
greater number of smaller agents handsomely supplemented incomes from 
shopkeeping or other activities. 
Lastly, migrants traveled home with thousands, sometimes tens of thousands 
of dollars' worth of Yemeni or Saudi riyals stuffed in their belts. This cash, like 
transfers through agents, was distributed in a number of ways. Sons made lump 
contributions to their family farms or trades in lieu of their work for the 
partnership, or paid debts to providers or protectors of their families in their 
absence. Brideprice and other marriage costs soared to over YR 100,000 (or 
$22,000) in some regions, paid to the bride's father (the largest share), the bride 
herself, and her women relatives. Finally, returnees spent exorbitantly on 
consumption for themselves, their extended families, and their friends. They 
bought clothes, gold, televisions, and linoleum, built new rooms onto family 
homes, and entertained lavishly. Chewing the mildly narcotic leaves of the qat 
plant, a luxury limited to certain high-elevation regions and high-income 
classes before the revolution, became a regular daily ritual for the vast majority 
of men and many women. A great deal more was spent on consumption than on 
production. 
The huge investment potential represented by remitted earnings, therefore, 
was not held solely or even mainly by migrants themselves but dispersed among 
agents and traders, fathers-in-law, female and male kin, construction 
contractors, and qat sellers. So the fact that in the aggregate a portion of 
remittances was translated into private and collective forms of investment does 
not necessarily mean that it was individual migrants who were doing the 
investing.7 Indeed, apart from a couple of agents, this aggregate spending power 
was very widely dispersed. 
The most common form of collective investment was in distributive services. 
Roads, water delivery, and electrification, in particular, were necessary to get 
Toyotas laden with televisions and washing machines to mountaintop villages. 
At least 60 per cent of the costs of some 15,000 kilometers of rough, bulldozer- 
hewn mountain tracks, hundreds of water collection and delivery projects, dozens 
of neighborhood, town, and village electrical generators, and scores of primary 
and intermediate school buildings and clinics, were borne in ad hoc fashion by 
agents and merchants, townspeople and traders, migrants and farmers, and 
sometimes the government and foreign donors.8 This type of expenditure figured 
prominently in overall domestic capital formation. These services, in turn, 
strengthened both commerce and the power of the central government in outlying 
areas, and greatly expanded opportunities for entrepreneurship. 
Collective investments rarely generated income directly; rather, they laid 
the basis for private investments. The vast majority of all farm and business 
investments were undertaken by individuals and families. Most were small 
scale: a 1980 survey by the Central Planning Organization showed only sixty- 
nine industrial establishments with more than ten workers, for example, and the 
agricultural labor force was overwhelmingly organized at the household level. 
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Individual investments operated within a pattern of incentives and 
constraints that favored the tertiary sector. First, to be viable in sheerly 
economic terms, a domestic investment should promise returns comparable to 
what could be made in Saudi Arabia. Beyond this, the twin pressures of 
inflation and scarce labor favored speculation stocks of imports or urban real 
estate even as the same inflation closed these options to new small investors. 
Petty shopkeeping and services like driving or grain grinding consequently 
became highly competitive and minimally profitable. For the skilled, small- 
scale construction-related industries uch as carpentry, metal door manufacture, 
and production of distinctly Yemeni arched stained-glass windows were good 
investments. 
In agriculture, the potential for investments in tractors and irrigation 
technology was limited first by the generally mountainous terrain and terrace 
cultivation and secondly by the limited number of contiguous holdings of a 
hectare or two. Such innovations also generally involved a substitution of hired 
for imputed (family) or fixed-share (tenant) labor. The most lucrative 
agricultural commodity in the late 1970s was the hardy, undemanding, highly 
marketable qat, grown only at certain elevations and serving a domestic market; 
other cash crops like cotton, dates, coffee, and tobacco suffered from the 
competition of imports. The most attractive sectors for private investment, 
therefore, were wholesale or retail trade in imports or qat, related 
transportation and services, and the real estate and construction sectors. 
While remittances were the source, direct or indirect, of most private capital, 
foreign donors underwrote the state. External loans, grants, and direct project 
assistance accounted for over three-quarters of government expenditures in the 
1976-81 period.10 The Saudis and other Gulf "petrocracies" had every incentive 
to be generous to the Y AR- neighbor, labor-supplier, excess capital absorber, 
potential breadbasket, bulwark against the communist menace in South Yemen. 
Important government infrastructure partly or wholly financed by Arab oil 
revenues included strings of stone school buildings, the University of Sana'a 
campus, and salaries for tens of thousands of non-Yemeni Arab teachers; direct 
subsidies both to the YAR central budget and to the recalcitrant northern tribes; 
major hospitals and other medical facilities; a complete national color 
television station; restoration of the ancient Marib dam to operating order; two 
paved north-south highways; technical planning assistance; and so forth. 
Direct bilateral assistance combined with Arab and international development 
funds to total billions of dollars for social and economic infrastructure, favoring 
the five main towns but not entirely neglecting provincial centers and rural 
areas. 
The oil boom also attracted other international donors to the YAR, the closest 
"needy" nation to the strategically and economically indispensable Arab Gulf. 
Hence along with the petrodollars came loans, grants, technical personnel, and 
scholarships from nearly every Western and socialist donor. For example, 
Egyptian, Sudanese, Russian, Chinese, German, Swedish, Norwegian, American, 
Yemen Arab Republic 201 
Italian, French, Irish, and other nationalities' doctors and nurses treated 
Yemeni patients. The World Bank took a lead in designing and financing major 
regional and infrastructural projects, and the United Nations organizations, the 
Arab Development Fund, and other multilateral agencies also played an active 
role. The Federal Republic of Germany was the largest non- Arab donor, followed 
by the USSR. Overall, foreign assistance enabled the government to undertake 
ambitious though poorly coordinated construction a d services programs. 
In short, then, remittances from current and previous migrants combined with 
foreign assistance to generate several forms of new investment: large-scale, 
state-sponsored infrastructure; smaller-scale, collectively financed services; 
some major and countless minor trading, transport, construction, and light 
industrial sector enterprises; and unprecedented marketing of imported 
manufactures and food. Massive external financing promoted the urban-based 
construction boom both directly in the form of contracts for roads, airports, public 
buildings, and other facilities, and indirectly in the form of demand for 
residences for Arab and Western expatriate workers. If remittances were fueling 
the "downscale" end of both demand and construction, international ssistance 
was financing large or "upscale" projects. 
The influx of private and public funds, an exploding domestic market, and 
fast-paced urban expansion together lured still another source of capital. What 
might be called the absentee bourgeoisie, the sons and daughters of Yemenis who 
had migrated to Aden, East Africa, Asia, Europe, and America before the 
revolution, began "returning" to Yemen as revolutions swept their new homes or 
simply because of rapid growth in the Yemeni economy. Many Adenis, North 
Yemenis, and half-Yemenis repatriated all or part of businesses such as 
equipment or auto dealerships or travel or currency exchanges; others invested in 
Yemeni real estate, construction, or modern restaurants and supermarkets. 
Another segment of this group brought fluency in technocratic English to high 
positions in the new ministries. Larger in number but smaller in influence were 
those who parlayed mechanical, office, or linguistic skills into "modern" sector 
jobs. Finally, refugees and emigrants from Vietnam and East Africa (im welcome 
in Saudi Arabia) formed the core of a new working class of factory workers and 
household servants. 
The transfer of vast sums into a small economy also hastened and molded a 
process of class transformation already begun when the inner circle of the old 
aristocracy collapsed. Absentee businessmen and intellectuals joined agent- 
banker-traders, a lone industrial magnate, some old monopolists, certain 
landowners, and the happy owners of farmland situated for sale as urban real 
estate in the emerging, primarily commercial bourgeoisie. Petty trade and 
restauranteuring, despised before the revolution, became popular occupations, 
and merchants earned new respect. Migration was the avenue for poor 
smallholders, sharecroppers, and artisans to enter the ranks of the self- 
employed petty bourgeoisie, but failed entrepreneurs, freed tenants, marginal 
smallholders, and poor emigrants constituted a small and growing wage-labor 
force. The mobility of labor, unprecedented value of non-landed wealth, and 
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changes in taxation, services, and commerce all challenged existing social 
relations. 
Economic expansion and class realignment entailed struggle, particularly 
between declining agrarian elites and rising commercial classes. Especially in 
the southern and central regions, the efforts of republican officers and 
administrators, merchants and peddlers, coffee and qat growers, and migrants 
and truck-owners to cut roads or divert irrigation water for household supplies 
met with resistance from landlords, who blocked bulldozers, intimidated work 
crews and brought lengthy legal, bureaucratic, and political suits. Competition 
among communities or clans for access to projects took the form of contests and 
tiny wars over road alignments, water utilization, generator ownership, and 
school or hospital locations. Many innovations complicated generations-old 
claims to water, land, and markets. 
From Sana'a, a succession of regimes fought to secure the state's tax base, its 
frontiers, and its legal authority. The forces resisting the state were diverse. 
Most cases contained elements of a tax revolt, and many regions conditioned 
loyalty on the provision of services and other benefits. The Hashid and Bakil 
tribes of the north and east, while hardly "traditional" when it came to market 
participation, presented tribal law as a viable alternative to central authority 
and charged that government projects favored the more productive southern and 
coastal regions. The Sunni Shafacis of these regions counteralleged that the 
republican government, as much as the imamic system before it, represented the 
Shiite Zaydi sect of the northern and central highlands. When struggles by 
communities of farmers, tradespeople, and migrants for access to new services 
faced feudal intransigence, on the one hand, or the preferred standing of a 
wealthier rival community, on the other, these struggles sometimes associated 
overtly with the loosely organized progressive movement known as the 
National Democratic Front (NDF) or simply "the front." These conditions were 
especially prevalent in those southern and central districts where traditional 
landowners' authority remained strong. 
One of the NDF s positions was support for unity, or at least closer cooperation, 
with South Yemen. Not only the small political left but also, in varying 
degrees, people in the southern uplands and Tihama, families with kin or 
personal ties to the South, and many educated nationalists argued that a single 
nation with coasts on two seas and combined budgets would be more viable than 
two states. This position was made somewhat enable at the governmental level 
by the fact that Southern natives held high positions in the YAR, as did 
Northerners in the PDRY. But it was vigorously opposed by many religious and 
economic conservatives, some merchants who had fled the revolution in the 
South, northern YAR regional interests fearing a southward shift in the 
national center of political gravity, and most especially by the Saudis. 
As its greatest benefactor, Saudi Arabia wielded considerable and sometimes 
paradoxical influence over the YAR. After 1970 Riyadh abandoned the royalist 
cause in favor of molding a friendly republican regime through bilateral 
assistance, subsidies to both tribal and rightist elements, and negotiations with 
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the United States on behalf of the YAR and against the PDRY. Massive 
budgetary support ensured a say in policy, as in the field of education, where 
university libraries closed for prayer, classes were segregated by sex, and at 
least one unveiled woman was stoned by fundamentalist students. Religious 
institutes replaced some secular community schools, and history books stressing a 
common legacy with South Yemen were revised. Cash grants to both the 
recalcitrant Hashid and Bakil confederations and the fundamentalist "Islamic 
Front" fortified resistance to the government and domestic progressives. All of 
these policies were just slightly contradictory, pushing modernization with a 
reactionary face and fostering overnment power within definite limits. 
The Saudis were now likened to the Egyptians a decade earlier. It was 
remarked that their broadcast news maps showed no southern border, and that 
this or that narrow stretch of frontier had been annexed by the Kingdom. 
Riyadh was implicated in the assassination of President al-Hamdi on the eve 
of a state visit to Aden, and in both the choice and the removal of his successor. 
The considerable influence of the Yemeni-Saudi Coordinating Committee in 
domestic as well as foreign policy was a source of irritation, as was the 
American sale of arms to Yemen through Riyadh in 1976. 
The year of two assassinations, 1977/78, was the nadir of state power. As 
usual, many of the northern tribes were in revolt. In the central and southern 
highlands the National Front "took over" a dozen or two districts, getting 
sympathizers into locally responsible positions, organizing community services 
and roads, evading taxes, and defying central authority. The amy, backed by 
some tribal contingents, counterattacked, driving some rebels into PDRY 
territory. By New Year's, 1979, much of the southern half of the YAR was in 
turmoil, and Soviet-trained PDRY forces were on alert. The Saudis worried lest 
the progressive movement penetrate the kingdom via migration, bring an NDF- 
inspired government 
to power in Sana'a, or gain their objective of uniting the two 
Yemens. 
Though largely unrelated, these events coincided with the Iranian revolution 
and with Arab opposition to Camp David, thus coming at a time when Riyadh 
was especially vital to Western security and oil supply interests. This 
confluence of events attracted unusual U.S. official, press, and scholarly 
attention to Saudi security concerns, notably surrounding events in Yemen. 
Following Defense Secretary Brown's visit with Prince Fahd, the Carter 
administration hastily ordered some $300 million worth of F-5 fighters, 
armored personnel carriers, tanks, howitzers, and light weapons for sale to 
Sana'a via the Saudis; and a shipment of fire-spitting Vulcan anti-aircraft 
weapons, promised in 1976, was dispatched immediately along with trainers 
and advisors. As the fighting escalated, Saudi troops went on alert, and the 
White House responded with a show of military force in the Arabian Gulf, 
another $100 million in arms, and authorization for covert operations based in 
North Yemen against the PDRY.12 
204 Arab Studies Quarterly 
Through this deal the Saudis regulated Yemeni access to the weapons, 
contingent among other things on limiting relations with the Soviets, the PDRY, 
and Libya, and guaranteed a still stronger Saudi role in North Yemeni domestic 
politics. The arms package constituted implicit American recognition of Yemen 
as a client state of Saudi Arabia, and Yemeni officials and citizens complained 
of Washington's failure to deal with the YAR as a sovereign state. 
Thus both politically and economically, the YAR had become integrated into 
the global political economy as a dependency of Saudi Arabia. Saudi control 
was not absolute, as new agreements with the USSR were soon to underscore, but 
there was no significant policy sphere- trade, finance, education, internal 
security, foreign policy- in which the Yemeni state was genuinely autonomous 
from its northern neighbor. This high degree of external dependency coincided 
with near anarchy in more than half of the country's eleven provinces as Sana'a 
faced not one but multiple insurrections and a virtual collapse of national 
taxation during the period 1977 through 1982. 
The down side of the cycle 
Between 1982 and 1985, the combined oil export revenues of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates lid from over $180 billion to under $60 
billion. During the same four years, private transfers into the YAR fell from $1.4 
billion to $.6 billion. Although the YAR remained a priority in the Gulfs 
sharply reduced foreign assistance budgets, the days of unchecked largesse were 
gone. Thus the two major supplies of hard cash to the YAR economy were 
curtailed. Yet, as in the Gulf itself, there was no return to the situation before 
the boom, because while revenues held constant or declined, many expenditures 
continued to climb. At both the national and the household levels, it cost more 
and more to maintain the standards and expectations tasted during the bonanza. 
Despite progress on necessary, basic infrastructure and services, very little of 
the cash "surplus" of the 1970s had led to productive substitutes for migration 
and importation. The government had been ill equipped to direct investments, 
and private investors found speculation in imports and real estate generally 
more lucrative than agriculture and industry. The results were felt in the 1980s. 
The money and water spent in agricultural development and manufacturing had 
yet to be justified in terms of either nutritional or hard currency returns, and 
equipment, fuel, and raw materials all came from abroad. While its GNP per 
capita now rested at a moderately comfortable $550 a year, deficits, debts, and 
underproductivity cast long shadows over the economy. 
Rates of new migration peaked in the late 1970s but numbers remained fairly 
high through the mid-1980s because the Arab Gulf economies still seemed to 
offer opportunities for earnings and savings that compared favorably to those 
available at home. But new migrants, finding the smaller numbers of jobs filled 
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by Asians accustomed to low wages, now often returned home after only eight or 
nine months with far more modest savings than their predecessors. 
External financing changed hands and forms. Assistance from Iraq dried up due 
to its war with Iran. The oil kingdoms continued to pay for existing programs but 
curtailed new grant commitments. Much of the difference was made up by new 
Arab and international loans, funds from East and West Europe and China, and 
disaster relief after the 1983 earthquake in Dhamar. In the meantime, however, 
earlier notes came due; some were rescheduled; more loans were taken. The 
spending power represented by international ssistance declined, and for the 
first ime the government resorted to private borrowing. 
Despite steady GNP growth for a decade, domestic production was lagging. 
The agriculture labor force, per cent of GDP from agriculture, proportion of all 
investment in the farm sector, share of national and family diets produced 
locally, agricultural exports, and overall food production all continued to drop. 
Localized gains on newly pump-irrigated holdings and the importation of 
expensive fertilizer and equipment notwithstanding, food production was lower 
in the mid-1980s than it had been a decade earlier, while cereal imports had 
increased more than fourfold. In addition, especially as long as the riyal 
retained parity with the dollar, domestic producers of Yemeni dates, coffee, 
cotton, tobacco, eggs, chickens, nuts, fruits, and oils all suffered from the 
competition of cheaper imports more efficiently marketed. Food and live 
animals represented 30 per cent of imports into a still primarily agricultural 
economy. 
With migration and farm opportunities tightening, unemployment threatened 
a formerly labor-short economy. Acute competition among throngs of drivers, 
shopkeepers, graingrinders, and even gas-station owners minimized their 
profits. Though still fairly brisk, annual additions to the state payroll for the 
army, office workers, and teaching, health, engineering, and maintenance staffs 
failed to pick up the slack, partly because foreigners filled so many skilled 
positions. No transnational corporate employers were drawn to the Yemeni 
market, for the labor force was unskilled and expensive by international 
standards. Chinese and Korean road construction contractors brought their own 
crews. Several thousand new jobs in public and private factories 
notwithstanding, most new "modern sector" jobs fed either the government or the 
trade deficits. And yet there remained acute shortages of skilled personnel. 
Earnings remained constant while inflation eroded spending power. The 
standard taxi fare of YR 15-20 between locations in Sana'a, daily wage rates 
from YR 50-150 per day, and government salaries around YR 1,500 a month 
barely changed between 1979 and 1987 despite inflation in commodity imports of 
25 per cent per annum. Having sacrificed a portion of the harvest to keep 
sharecroppers on the land a decade earlier, landlords now demanded a return to 
the status quo ante or took bank loans for inputs to justify retaining a larger 
share, so sharecropper incomes declined. Imported white wheat steadily 
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depressed demand for the rainfed grain crops of the great majority of small 
farmers. 
Household, business, and public consumption of imports mounted, while the 
value of exports stagnated. In the early 1980s, the World Bank figures grew 
ominous. In 1980 there was a current account deficit of $478 million, and external 
public debt of $836 million, equal to 27 per cent of GNP. Still annual debt 
payments of $5 million a year came to only .6 per cent of GNP and only 6 per cent 
of the value of exports of goods and services; while international reserves, at 
$1,289 million, were still adequate to cover seven months' imports. Three years 
later the picture was much darker. The current account deficit reached $558 
million. External public debt, now $1,574 million or more than 38 per cent of 
GNP, required annual payments of $13 million or 1 per cent of GNP and 14 per 
cent of the value of goods and services exported. Reserves, down to $369 million, 
a quarter of what they had been, would now cover only two months' spending 
abroad. In 1983, exports of $204 million compared with imports of $1,521 
million. 
Balance of trade deficits led to austerity measures beginning with the second 
five-year plan in 1982. The riyal, which during the boom years had been held at 
a constant, unified value against the dollar of $1=YR 4.5, was devalued; and 
imports, particularly of fruits and vegetables, were restricted to make domestic 
produce more competitive locally. But deficits dipped only slightly before 
worsening further. By mid-1986 a dollar would buy nearly twelve riyals, and 
more could be had on the black market. In August 1986, imports were temporarily 
suspended to trim that year's deficit and reduce consumer demand through 
higher prices. In 1987 the government brought suit against Sana'a's biggest 
moneychangers /remittance agents, forcing them to close shop and unifying the 
price of the riyal at the bank rate (between 9 and 10 riyals per dollar). 
All the while, road use and demand for schools, medical facilities, 
electrification, and water pumping schemes still multiplied. In twenty years, 
crude birth rates had dropped 6 per cent and death rates 21 per cent thanks in 
part to over ten times more doctors and other medical personnel. A third of 
children were in primary school. Annual energy consumption was up to the 
equivalent of 116 kilograms of oil per capita. In cities and towns, consumption of 
piped water and packaged goods created the need for sewers and regular garbage 
disposal. As use of and demand for services mushroomed, so did government 
expenses. Not surprisingly, with revenues down and expenditures up, ministries 
couldn't make ends meet. By 1982 the government deficit had climbed to a third 
of GDP. By cracking down on smuggling and tax evasion, the government 
managed within five years to drive its deficit below twenty per cent of GDP, 
while the debt service ratio rose to about fifteen per cent. 
As the government response to the economic crunch indicates, its role in 
economic policy was stronger than during the bonanza. President Salih survived 
a difficult first few years to surpass the tenure of any of his republican 
predecessors, replace banditry with check points on the nation's roads, and 
establish central administration in all eleven provinces. The army gained the 
Yemen Arab Republic 207 
upper hand over but did not impose defeat upon the tribes and leftist forces; 
instead, some leaders were drawn into government and others into a "national 
dialogue" on constitutional proposals. Local administration was integrated 
with the multi-tiered network of cooperative development councils, whose 
nationwide lections drew more and more voters in each round between 1976 and 
1986. After a fundamentalist victory in these polls in 1982, more progressives 
and intellectuals and even a handful of women were elected in 1986. National 
security surveillance shifted from the Yemeni to the expatriate community. 
Legitimacy and control were reinforced. One important and complex policy 
restricted border crossings to passport holders and then denied passports to non- 
veteran men, bringing sons of ministers as well as of innkeepers and 
sharecroppers into the army. Illiterates erved an extra year in reading classes. 
The draft plus additions to the civil service put thousands of families into state 
insurance, purchasing, and financial programs, while schools and training 
facilities and national television exposed them to the emerging civic culture. 
Construction of national infrastructure, generally with foreign assistance, 
reinforced central authority. Roads and massive government complexes, and also 
schools, hospitals, and the national electricity system, had all helped extend 
the physical presence of the state to the frontier provinces of al-Bayda, Marib, 
the Jawf, and Sacadah. Public buildings and services also penetrated down to the 
district level. Its provision of services and assertion of military control enabled 
the regime to centralize both tax collection and expenditures for local services, 
raising its own revenues and limiting the autonomy of communities to undertake 
projects. Even local and regional projects, which as often as not were a challenge 
to central authority at the outset, ultimately buttressed state hegemony. 
Via migration, remittances, imports, wages, and services, every household 
was now tied into the riyal economy, and thus into the realm manipulated by 
monetary policy and affected by changes in foreign exchange. The contraction in 
foreign exchange, far more than the expansion that preceded it, called for 
decisive state action to marshal investments. The result was that for the first 
time since the revolution the government was practicing economic policy as 
opposed to pursuing a construction schedule. While still an open-market policy, 
this was a marked change from the extreme laissez-faire of the seventies. 
Although the government acted against commercial interests in suspending 
imports, closing moneychangers, enforcing customs taxes, and imposing other 
austerity-linked measures, by and large the interests of the state and those of 
the bourgeoisie coincided in broad areas such as education, internal security, 
transport and communications, urban development, and multilateral foreign 
assistance, as well as in specific project-related purchasing and contracts. These 
interests triumphed over the motley range of landed, leftist, fundamentalist, 
and tribal forces, in part by co-opting them. 
Reduced financial and economic dependence and greater internal hegemony 
enabled the YAR to assert greater autonomy vis-à-vis its northern neighbor. 
Controls on smuggling and passport checks made economic boundaries less 
permeable. Reductions in Saudi subsidies to the tribes and the religious right 
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eased several pressures and cleavages that had undermined the republic in the 
1970s. Fences were mended with South Yemen and the NDF, and unity was 
prominent on the national political agenda. While observers were rarely 
sanguine about a true merger of the "socialist" PDRY with the "capitalist" 
YAR, common tourism, economic and communications ventures, publication and 
extensive discussion of unity clauses in the constitutional documents, joint forces 
sent to Lebanon during Israeli attacks, and other forms of cooperation long 
regarded as anathema to the Saudis now symbolized Yemeni nationalism and 
independence. Most analysts agreed that the YAR was successfully playing the 
Soviets against the Saudis and plotting a relatively independent foreign 
policy.14 
In the mid-1980s, reserves of at least 500 million barrels of oil, well beyond 
domestic needs, were discovered in the YAR' s eastern basin. Contracts with Hunt 
Oil led to hopes of revenues by the 1990s, but also necessitated a half a billion 
dollars' investment over a two-to-three year period, virtually all foreign 
exchange for purchases abroad. Fearful that being an oil exporter would reduce 
the country's prospects for concessional foreign assistance, the Central Planning 
Organization pointed out that even over a ten-year horizon revenues were not 
expected to offset he decline in remittances.15 In any case, the discovery, and 
evidence of additional reserves, put an end to planners' worst fears about the 
future of foreign exchange. Though its reserves were small compared with the 
Saudis', they put the YAR on the footing of a competitor for the first ime, and 
both Yemenis and Americans braced for maneuvers to delay or control its oil and 
gas production. 
In the short run, at least, the YAR was no less dependent on external financing 
to implement its domestic projects, but it was an increasingly multilateral 
dependency on Arab, Communist, Western, and multilateral organizations that 
granted no extraordinary influence to any one donor but rather afforded 
considerable leverage. The most prominent influence in developing the 1986-91 
five-year plan was the World Bank, which proposed to co-finance capital- 
intensive agricultural modernization in the northern and eastern regions along 
the lines of projects already operating in the Tihama and the southern uplands 
and being executed in the central region. In unveiling the plan, the Central 
Planning Organization advised other donors that future projects must conform to 
targeted strategies and activities, else they would be declined. 
While allocating capital to the oil sector, the third five-year plan gave 
priority to agriculture, where the strategy was to promote a "green revolution" 
in heretofore semi-arid regions by experimenting with imported technology and 
extending it through credit packages to cash farmers. The newly completed 
Marib Dam and a water development scheme for Wadi al-Jawf, both in the east, 
would bring thousands of hectares under private commercial production. The 
development plan for industry, while including some projects run by individual 
state agencies, likewise was to provide public, deficit-financed support for 
private investment in medium- to large-scale enterprises. This private-sector 
approach is a product not simply of the Bank's blueprint, for the Bank also 
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works with the PDRY, but also of the political and economic situation in the 
YAR. It defines the national economic interest as that of private equipment and 
machinery importers, kulak farmers, and native industrialists: neither the old 
landlords or the private financiers and consumer-goods importers of the 
remittance-boom era, but a productive capitalist class. 
In the YAR, oil revenues can be expected to have a significant impact on 
domestic politics. The situation during the boom was one of capital dispersion, in 
which the private sector took initiatives independently of the government's 
plans and even taxation. Conversely, the Yemeni share of revenues from its oil 
production will accrue to the newly created Ministry of Oil and Mineral 
Resources. This foreign exchange will therefore be available to the state itself, 
or to a "state class" managing public assets, to invest in projects as it sees fit.16 
The result should be a more powerful state more able to direct the economy 
through project initiatives, a reconfiguration of the bourgeoisie around managers 
of public assets, alliance of this class group with transnational corporate 
interests, and perhaps its clash with agrarian or other interests. In any case, it 
will be a more complex class situation entailing a correspondingly more complex 
series of questions regarding autonomy. 
CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL AND STATE AUTONOMY 
Four points may be distilled from this account. First and foremost, the cycle in 
oil prices helped carry through the bourgeois revolution, that is, the 
penetration of capitalism and re-establishment of state hegemony and the 
struggles they entailed, such that national and state autonomy are now issues. 
Second, although its integration into world markets necessarily implied a loss of 
earlier autonomy, the contraction in currency transfers was associated with a 
relative restoration of national control over the allocation of resources. Thus, in 
1988, the prerequisites for either self-directed capitalist development or 
dependency are in place. Third, the state is more autonomous from its class base 
than it was three decades ago, but now actively promotes the interests of a rising 
class as the interests of the nation. Finally, in recent experience there seems to 
have been something of a tradeoff between national and state autonomy, leading 
to the question of whether the YAR possesses sufficient legal, financial, and 
executive clout to exercise both hegemony and absolute autonomy from domestic 
and foreign interests. 
One feature of dependency is overwhelming reliance on the sale of a single 
primary commodity for foreign exchange, such that fluctuations in the world 
price of that commodity determine growth or recession in the dependent 
economy. The YAR, exporting the most primary of all commodities, labor, 
experienced this dependency at second hand. Economic demand for Yemeni labor 
was generated by oil revenues to labor-short Arab countries, in turn determined 
by intricate global political and economic forces far, far beyond Yemeni 
influence. Although the YAR was not an oil producer, the price of oil was more 
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decisive for trends in GNP and national accounts than were domestic agriculture 
and industry combined. 
The Yemenis learned that growth does not necessarily foster autonomy. Short- 
term growth realized from massive labor export and foreign aid reduced rather 
than enhanced economic and political independence. The period of greatest 
dependency brought development, if development is understood as transition 
from precapitalism to capitalism. Infrastructural progress accompanied the 
emergence of a new coalition favoring commerce over autarky and nationalist 
over theocratic values. The fortunes of millions of people became tied to the 
marketplace instead of the weather. But the development was dependent in 
that it was largely non-productive and externally oriented, thus ultimately not 
self-sustaining. 
The strengthening and then loosening of ties to the regional core actually 
helped fortify Yemen's own core, centralizing political authority and economic 
control. In its third decade, the YAR's state and newly enriched classes enjoy 
unprecedented ability to appropriate and allocate resources within a political 
economy defined at the national level. Spending power that was widely 
dispersed is now increasingly concentrated. The periphery (workers, farmers, 
consumers) now must go through the center (the state, major trading houses) to 
get at the earnings (remittances, profits from trade) and resources (foreign aid, 
funding for local services) that could formerly be accessed directly. The Yemeni 
center has, in effect, bought internal hegemony with external political and 
financial debts, but is nonetheless omewhat better able to allocate resources to 
its own development than a decade earlier. 
Prospects for relatively autonomous national development might well be 
greater than before the bonanza, inasmuch as infrastructural overhead can now 
support productive investment. Roads and utilities constructed at the regional 
and local level created a very rudimentary et widespread network of services 
to support agricultural and even light industrial production for the market, 
rather than the concentration of expenditures in one or two wealthy urban, 
mining, or farm areas that typifies deep structural dependency. Foreign 
ownership in the economy is minimal. At the same time, the preconditions for 
dependency are also in place: national debts and deficits, the external 
intervention i to planning and management hey bring, an underemployed and 
underproductive domestic labor force, and newly prominent classes' external 
orientations. 
It is now correct o identify the bourgeoisie as the dominant class, but with 
some qualification. First, vestiges of subsistence and tributary modes of 
production persist and may do so for some time to come. Secondly, the bourgeoisie 
is primarily a commercial class whose ties to workers have heretofore been 
indirect: to appropriate or accumulate the surplus of Yemeni labor, entrepreneurs 
have to handle their money, sell them goods, or construct heir houses. While 
fairly lucrative, selling services does not have the connotations, or the effects, of 
employing labor. In Marxist terms, there is no direct class relation (or dynamic) 
between the bourgeoisie and working people. 
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State policy, the interests of the state as it sees them, is to encourage those 
with private capital to use it to both employ and economize on labor in 
productive nterprises. As an American-school comparative advantage-based 
model, it proposes to competitively export fruits and vegetables to finance the 
importation of consumer and capital goods. This policy does not directly go 
against either landowning or commercial interests, but it is designed to 
strengthen still nascent industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs and, by 
association, the formation of a proper working class. The state has defined its 
own interests in conjunction with investors in light of domestic and foreign 
political and exchange factors, therefore, rather than in response to prodding 
from kulaks and industrialists. Concerned above all with its hegemony, 
ideological, financial, and physical, the government seeks alliance with 
modern, entrepreneurial, national interests and will use state resources and 
assistance from sympathetic donors to empower them. 
The theoretical point underscored by the Yemeni case study is that 
paradigmatic assumptions about national and state autonomy, whether the 
mainstream assertion that nation-states are by definition autonomous or the 
dependency inference that all Third World governments lack autonomy, cannot 
be made. Rather, national and state autonomy are variables. Quite simply, this 
means that each can take a range of values from positive to negative; that there 
is no necessary association between the two; and that other variables, 
specifically in this case the world price of petroleum, can be expected to alter 
the configuration of the state's relationship to outside powers and domestic 
classes. 
NOTES 
1. Modernization theory compares parallel histories across nation-states; although 
autonomy is not part of its basic vocabulary, the legitimacy, efficacy, and control of the 
state are a primary focus of inquiry. By contrast, world-systems conception of a single 
global history raises more questions about the peripheral state's autonomy from ruling 
class interests of the core than about internal state-building and capital accumulation. 
Whereas the former tends to assume both internal nd external autonomy, the latter tends 
to assume the opposite. Current scholarship fuses the two perspectives in various ways. 
For instance, Thomas M. Callaghy defines the "search for sovereignty b  the ruler and a 
ruling class" as "a quest for separation, autonomy, and diminished dependence vis-à-vis 
internal societal groups and classes and external groups in the world political and 
economic environment"; "Absolutism, Bonapartism, and the Formation of Ruling Classes: 
Zaire in Comparative Perspective," in Studies in Power and Class in Africa , ed. I.L. 
Markovitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 19 87). 
2. This has led to criticisms from Marxists such as Bill Warren, "The Postwar Economic 
Experience of the Third World," and James H. Weaver and Marguerite Berger, "The 
Marxist Critique of Dependency Theory: An Introduction" (both in The Political Economy 
of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. Charles K. Wilber (New York: Random 
House, 1984). It is of course well known that Andre Gunder Frank, widely cited as the 
founder of the dependista school, has now declared development and underdevelopment 
theories equally bankrupt. 
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3. Samir Amin finds four groups of countries the wealthy, underpopulated petroleum- 
exporters, with only 10 per cent of the region's population but half the GDP and export 
earnings; a couple of more industrialized oil-exporters, which benefitted most from the 
boom; larger group of lightly industrialized non-exporters with half the population of 
the Arab world but only 20 percent of its income; and finally the "particularly 
underprivileged" periphery, including Yemen. The Arab Economy Today (London: Zed 
Books, 1982), 42-47. 
Amin, of course, is the notable, and controversial, exception to the generalization made 
about the scholarly distance between Middle East studies and dependency theory. He has< also paid considerable attention tothe internal dynamics of dependency. His analysis of 
the mechanisms ofappropriation from the periphery to the center has recently led him to call for "delinking" of peripheral nations from the world system. 
4. Eric A. Nordlinger, 'Taking the State Seriously, in Understanding Political 
Development, ed.Weiner and Huntington (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), 353. 
5. John M. Cohen and David B. Lewis, "Capital Surplus, Labor Short Economies: Yemen as a Challenge to Rural Development S rategies," in the American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics. (1979), review the literature on migration in Yemen through 1978, much of 
which was optimistic that remittances would be translated into productive private sector 
investments. 
6. The social effects of migration on sending communities have been the topic of 
considerable r search. Ahmad al-Kasir's "The Impact of Emigration o  Social Structure inthe Yemen Arab Republic," in Economy , Society, and Culture in Contemporary Yemen, ed. B.R. Pridham (London: Croom Helm, 1985) and Cynthia Myntti's "Yemeni Workers Abroad: The Impact on Women," MERIP Reports, no. 124 (June 1984), both focus on the 
agricultural economy. 
7. Swanson has found in two studies in different regions that migrants were not 
especially inclined to invest heir earnings in either private or collective enterprises. See 
Jon Swanson, "Some Consequences of Migration for Rural Economic Development in the Yemen Arab Republic," Middle East Journal 33, no. 1 (1979), and "Emigrant Remittances and Local Development: Cooperatives inthe Yemen Arab Republic," inPridham, ed. 
8. Although it is dear that in the aggregate the ready cash to finance services came from remittances, there is very little ethnographic evidence of migrants as a group 
leading local project initiatives. See Swanson, "Emigrant Remittances"; Swanson and 
Mary Hebert, Rural Society and Participatory Development: Case Studies of Two 
Villages in the Yemen Arab Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Rural Development 
Committee, Yemen Research Program, September 1981); and Sheila Carapico, "Self-Help and Development Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic" in Public Participation i  
Development Planning and Management, ed. Jean-Claude-Garcia Z mor (Boulder: 
Westview, 1985). 
9. Sheila Carapico and Richard Tutwiler, Yemeni Agriculture and Economic Change 
(Sana'a: American Institute for Yemeni Studies, 1981). Shelagh Weir's chapter on "The Economics of Qat Consumption" in Qat in Yemen : Consumption and Social Change (London: British Museum Publications, 1985) analyzes investment as well as consumption. 
10. Abdul-Karim Ahmed Omer, Economic Planning in the Yemen Arab Republic: The 
Dependency Problem (Sana'a: Dar Azai, 1986), chap. 5, appraises problems of planning and dependency using an economic model. 
According to statistics ited by Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair in Oil, Debt, and 
Development: OPEC in the Third World (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), 101, the YAR ranked sixth in OPEC bilateral aid between 1973 and 1977, with $593 million, 
although on a per capita basis aid to North Yemen was second only to Jordan, and the PDRY followed close behind. Hallwood and Sinclair argue that debts accumulated as a result of OPEC actions outweighed financial assistance, even for the majority of aid 
recipients hat were, like Yemen, also major labor exporters. 
11. Between 1972 and 1982, the YAR and the PDRY alternated between warfare and 
negotiations for unity. See Sultan Nagi, "The Genesis of the Call for Yemeni Unity," and Ursula Braun, "Prospects for Yemeni Unity," both in Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Abdel wahab El- Affendi et al., "Unity: A Will They, Won't They Saga," in "Yemen File," Arabia: The Islamic World Review, no. 30 (February 1984): 45-46. Helen Lackner's "The State in the 1980s" in P.D.R. Yemen: Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia (London: Ithaca 
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Press, 1985) recounts he events in terms of South Yemeni politics. Steven Page, The Soviet 
Union and the Yemens: Influence in Asymmetrical Re ationships (New York: Praeger, 
1985), entitles his two chapters on North Yemen "Moscow and the YAR: Relations at Low 
Ebb (1970-77)" and "Disaster and Recovery (1978-84)." 
12. This is the story as reported in the New York Times and the Washington Post, 
although there is evidence that he CIA's covert operations in Yemen go back even further 
to a time when its overall Middle Eastern activities were limited. For accounts of the 
events, see Bernard Weinraub, "Yemen, Sudan to Get Added Arms," New York Times, 12 
February 1979, p. A4; Drew Middleton, "The Mideast Power Balance and Brown's Tour of 
Area," New York Times, 13 February 1979, p. AIO; "Attacks Reported on Border Between 
the Two Yemens," New York Times, 25 February 1979, p. All; Edward Cody, "Hostilities 
in Yemen Pit Marxist Regime Against Ally of the West, " Washington Post, 27 February 
1979, p. A9; "U.S. Is Sending Arms to Yemen," New York Times, 27 February 1979, p. All; 
and "South Yemen Asks Death for 13 in Sabotage Case," New York Times, 13 March 1982, 
p. A5. Finally, Bob Woodward's "Carlucci Launched CIA Operation in Yemen That 
Collapsed," in Washington Post, 4December 1986, appeared in the context of controversial 
reports of Saudi involvement i  covert U.S. arms dealings with Iran and the Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries. Th  events are chronicled in more detail by Nadav Safran in 
Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1985), especially 282-94 and 387-97, and by Anthony H. 
Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability: Saudi Arabia, the Military 
Balance in the Gulf, and Trends in the Arab-Israeli Military Balance 
(Boulder: Westview, 1984), both of which stress the stability of Yemen as the foremost 
Saudi security concern. For a Saudi view of the necessity of Yemeni dependence on the 
kingdom, see Saeed Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over North Yemen, 1962-70 
(Boulder: Westview, 1986). A less sympathetic view of the U.S. /Saudi connection is
offered by Joe Stork, "The Gulf: Target for U.S. Intervention," MERIP, no. 85 (February 
1980), "Hie Carter Doctrine and U.S. Bases in the Middle East," MERIP, no. 90 (September 
1980), and "Saudi Oil and the U.S.," MERIP, no. 91 (October 1980). 
13. This paper cannot do justice to the complexities and variations in tenancy 
arrangements, which in any case differ considerably by region, irrigation, crop, and socioeconomic c rcumstances. However, field research in the late 1970s produced a series of 
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